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For centuries, the maritime domain has been a pillar of European livelihoods and 
prosperity through fishing and global trade. In modern times, we have come to depend 
on maritime transport to keep our economy going. Recently, however, old and new 
threats have challenged the security of the European Union: increased tensions 
between great powers; piracy in Somalia and West Africa; illegal immigration issues 
in the Mediterranean area; and increased concerns about terrorism and the illegal 
trafficking of drugs, arms and humans into Europe. These direct risks and threats are 
aggravated by pollution, illegal fishing and the destruction of livelihoods overseas.
Dealing with these challenges, risks and threats calls for a broad spectrum of 
instruments, of which many are in the maritime domain. Yet the scope of the 
challenges is such that a more comprehensive response is required, involving all 
sectors and including civilian and military assets at both the national and EU levels. 
This implies the need for policies that bring together and coordinate actors with 
varying legal mandates, practices and attitudes.
The EU Maritime Security Strategy
Promoting or Absorbing European 
Defence Cooperation?
April 2015
In June 2014 the European Union made 
progress towards an integrated response to 
maritime security challenges by adopting the 
EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS).1 
This strategy recognizes the different 
security interests and threats, and provides 
a comprehensive approach to dealing with 
interests ranging from freedom of navigation 
and economic interests to border security 
and conservation of biodiversity. The strategy 
lists direct threats such as conventional 
military challenges, piracy and terrorism, as 
1 European Union Maritime Security Strategy, 
11205/14, adopted by the General Affairs Council 
on 24 June 2014.
well as indirect threats stemming from illegal 
fishing and climate change.
This Clingendael Policy Brief evaluates 
the EUMSS from a European defence 
perspective. It discusses its main features 
and plans for implementation, reviews the 
opportunities that the strategy provides for 
advancing European defence cooperation 
and steering further development of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), and scrutinizes whether the 
strategy’s integrated approach to maritime 
security results in defence being absorbed 
into the EU’s internal security sphere.
2Clingendael Policy Brief
The Maritime Security Strategy
The EUMSS is the most comprehensive 
and integrated EU security strategy to date. 
While building on existing strategies such as 
the 2003 European Security Strategy2 and 
the 2010 Internal Security Strategy,3 it links 
internal and external policies. The EUMSS 
also cuts across various sectors dealing 
with the maritime domain and bridges 
the civilian–military divide. The document 
engages national authorities, industry, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), 
the European Commission, Council and 
international actors. The EUMSS also uses 
a comprehensive definition of maritime 
security, which includes enforced (inter)
national law and freedom of the seas, and 
the protection of citizens, infrastructure, 
transport, resources and the environment.
The EUMSS has four guiding principles.
1. A cross-sectoral approach, aimed at 
coordination and cooperation among 
civilian, military, research and industry 
actors, as well as EU agencies.
2. Maintaining the functional integrity 
of the ‘ecosystem’ by making use of 
existing structures, instruments, policies, 
mandates and competences at the 
national and EU levels.
3. Respect for human rights, democracy 
and international law – in particular, 
full compliance with the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).
4. Adherence to maritime multilateralism by 
cooperating with international partners 
and organizations – in particular the 
United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) – and by 
coordinating with international and 
regional maritime forums.
With the aim of effectively dealing with the 
broad range of challenges, risks and threats, 
the strategy also proposes strengthening the 
EU’s response in five areas.
2 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European 
Security Strategy, 12 December 2003.
3 Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: 
Towards a European Security Model, 5842/2/10 REV 
2 JAI 90, agreed by the Council on 25 March 2010.
1. Mainstreaming maritime security in 
external action, relying on multilateralism, 
the comprehensive approach and regional 
capacity-building.
2. Creating a common ‘maritime picture’ 
by combining the various existing 
surveillance and information systems.
3. Improving capabilities, using pooling 
and sharing, dual-use initiatives and 
standardization.
4. Enhancing the capacity for crisis 
prevention and crisis response through 
common risk analysis and cooperation in 
planning.
5. Bringing together various civilian–military 
and public–private training programmes 
and research entities and promoting 
inter-agency exercises.
In short, the EU Maritime Security Strategy 
seeks to generate cost and efficiency 
benefits by increasing comprehensiveness, 
coordination and coherence across the 
many sectors and actors dealing with a 
wide variety of security-related issues in 
the maritime domain. As the strategy aims 
to accomplish this without changing or 
creating new budgets, mandates, policies or 
structures that would otherwise incentivize 
or force actors to cooperate, successful 
implementation of the strategy is more 
dependent on the will of actors to heed the 
call for cooperation. The fact that this does 
not come naturally can be deduced from the 
strategy’s drafting process.
From Drafting to Implementing 
the Strategy4
Implementation of the strategy depends 
on cooperation among the various national 
and EU actors. Reaping the benefits of 
comprehensiveness and integration requires 
that policies be based on a shared analysis 
of the problem, striving towards the same 
4 For a detailed description of institutional dynamics 
during the drafting process, see M. Chou and 
M. Riddervold, Beyond Delegation: How the 
European Commission Affects Intergovernmental 
Policies through Expertise, ARENA Working Paper 
12/2014, November 2014. 
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overall goals, complementing each other, and 
certainly not duplicating or counteracting 
each other’s efforts. The unfortunate reality, 
however, is that the sectoral interests, legal 
constraints and cultures of each EU actor 
and member state tend to diverge. Policies 
at both the national and the EU levels have 
long been stovepiped. Breaking this habit 
requires more than declarations of increased 
comprehensiveness. Implementation of the 
EUMSS requires sustained political pressure.
The process towards the EUMSS was long. 
The European Commission’s Integrated 
Maritime Policy (IMP) of 20075 dealt with the 
broad spectrum of maritime issues on the 
economy, industry, development, safety and 
security from a civilian (internal) perspective. 
For a long time, the EU member states’ 
capitals were not keen on expanding such 
initiatives, which would take the role of the 
European Commission into intergovernmental 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
territory. The Commission in turn blocked 
the Council’s initiative for a military-scoped 
maritime strategy in 2010,6 because it wanted 
a cross-sectoral strategy in line with the 
IMP.7 The EEAS felt that it could not proceed 
without the support of the Commission, while 
Catherine Ashton, split between the two 
institutions because of her position as High 
Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-
President of the Commission (HR/VP) was 
not able to force a breakthrough. The current 
HR/VP Federica Mogherini is, however, in 
a better position to use her ‘double-hatted’ 
role. For the implementation phase of the 
Maritime Security Strategy, Mogherini should 
clarify the division of labour and push for 
better cooperation between the Commission 
and EEAS where needed.
Due to the difference of opinion between 
the Commission and the EEAS/Council, 
5 Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions, An Integrated Maritime Policy for the 
European Union, COM/2007/0575, 10 October 2007.
6 Foreign Affairs Council, Council Conclusions on 
Maritime Security Strategy, 26 April 2010.
7 Chou and Riddervold, Beyond Delegation, p. 9.
work on the Maritime Security Strategy 
did not progress until 2014. The December 
2013 European Council put a deadline on 
a maritime strategy for June 2014. The 
EEAS and Commission jointly agreed on a 
communiqué on ‘elements’ for a maritime 
security strategy by March 2014.8
Although the Council would not accept or 
amend this text as the strategy itself, the 
ideas of the Commission and EEAS served as 
the basis for the final EU Maritime Security 
Strategy, which was adopted in June 2014 
under the guidance of the Greek presidency. 
The Council rejected some of the proposed 
elements, such as a reference to private 
security contractors (a contested topic in 
several EU member states). The Council also 
did not accept the Commission as leader for 
the rolling Action Plan on implementing the 
strategy, and instead gave that to the ‘Friends 
of the Presidency’ group,9 which drafted 
the plan under the guidance of the Italian 
presidency.
The Rolling Action Plan
The rolling Action Plan, which was adopted 
by the Council on 16 December 2014, 
elaborates how the strategy should be 
implemented.10 The Action Plan identifies 
130 action points, which are divided into 
work strands dealing with the earlier 
mentioned five areas that – according to 
the Maritime Security Strategy – need a 
strengthened EU response. The plan should 
provide a programme for up to five years, 
with delivery horizons assigned to work 
strands ranging from immediate to medium 
and long-term. The plan is intended to be 
8 Joint Communication to the European Parliament 
and the Council, For an Open and Secure Global 
Maritime Domain: Elements for a European 
Union Maritime Security Strategy, JOIN/2014/09, 
6 March 2014.
9 This working group is established on an ad-hoc 
basis to tackle a particular complicated issue. It is 
convened by the presidency, operates on a level 
similar to the Antici group for COREPER II, and can 
consist of national political counsellors and subject 
matter experts as well as Commission, EDA and 
EEAS officials.
10 EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan, 17002/14, 
16 December 2014.
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a ‘living’ document, with the possibility of 
adding or amending elements where needed.
Action points that are particularly relevant 
to the defence sector deal with capability 
development and research and innovation. 
These largely follow the priorities set out 
by the European Council of December 2013 
and the Commission’s communication and 
roadmap on defence:11
– harmonizing standardization and 
certification;
– investing in dual-use12 research and 
innovation;
– supporting the industrial base;
– setting up a regime for security of supply;
– generating (dual-use) capabilities; and
– synergising the activities of the Commis-
sion and the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) in areas such as Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft Systems (RPAS), cyber security 
and satellite systems.
The work strand also contains an action 
point on investigating the added value 
of EU-owned and operated dual-use 
capabilities.13
In addition, emphasis is placed on improving 
maritime surveillance and information-
sharing, which has its own dedicated 
work strand. Actions focus, for example, 
on promoting the exchange of information 
among EU agencies and member states 
through systems such as the Common 
Information Security Environment (CISE), 
the Maritime Surveillance Network 
(MARSUR) and the European External 
Borders Surveillance System (Eurosur) for 
the benefit of (national) border surveillance 
as well as CSDP operations.
Unfortunately, the current implementation 
process does not adequately address the 
11 European Commission ‘A New Deal for Euro-
pean Defence: Implementation Roadmap for 
Communication’, COM (2013) 542, 24 June 2014. 
12 Dual-use means that a civilian research or 
capability project can also be used for military 
applications (and vice versa). 
13 The action goes on to stress that all ‘military’ 
capabilities remain owned, controlled and operated 
by EU member states.
challenges of coordinating among the many 
actors involved, and since there are no new 
funds or mandates, it will be difficult to move 
reluctant actors to action. A major concern 
is that the rolling Action Plan does not fully 
clarify who leads on each work strand. 
Although the plan identifies several ‘lead 
actors’ per work strand, an actual division of 
labour is not made. This approach of ‘wait 
and see who and what emerges’ avoids some 
hard-to-resolve discussions about who is 
the leader. There is a risk of turf battles or, 
more likely, inaction where no one takes 
the initiative. The ‘Friends of the Presidency’ 
group is tasked with coordinating the 
implementation, and reviewing and reporting 
on its progress. However, it is doubtful 
whether the group has the capacity to 
coordinate effectively among the actors 
involved and push implementation along. 
In addition, many action points rely on the 
member states taking the initiative, yet the 
defence bureaucracies of some smaller 
states do not have the spare capacity to 
devote to such efforts. At worst, this leads 
to inaction. At best, it leads to selective 
implementation. An alternative would be 
for EU member states with more capacity 
(as well as the Commission in some cases) 
to provide leading frameworks to which 
others can contribute, shifting the focus 
of ‘Friends of the Presidency’ meetings 
away from coordinating towards evaluating 
implementation.
Although austerity has put significant stress 
on the resources of defence departments, 
they should invest in participating in, or 
contributing to, the many working bodies 
and expert groups that will elaborate parts 
of the implementation. By providing input 
early on, they can ensure that the resulting 
standards, capability requirements or sharing 
agreements take their specific needs into 
consideration. This should be a coordinated 
effort among defence stakeholders. The 
temptation to create various ‘wish lists’ 
according to national defence preferences 
should be resisted. EDA and NATO standards 
should be followed where possible.
The Maritime Security Strategy provides 
a platform for further development of the 
CSDP and increasing European defence 
cooperation by stimulating the defence 
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industry, dual-use research and capability 
development, and by improving information-
sharing. However, it is also of concern that 
the cross-sectoral nature of the strategy 
and the prominent role that the European 
Commission plays will result in military 
elements being appropriated for internal 
and civilian security issues such as border 
control and fighting illegal trafficking – in the 
process diverting energy and capacity away 
from considerations of external security and 
defence. This raises the question of whether 
the EUMSS is promoting European defence 
cooperation and external security, or whether 
it is absorbing them into the communitarian 
internal sphere.
Promoting European Defence
The EUMSS potentially forms a platform 
for the further development of the maritime 
dimension of the CSDP and generates effects 
that are beneficial to the CSDP and defence 
cooperation in general.
Dual-use Research and Capabilities
The strategy provides an opportunity to 
implement the agenda of the European 
Council and the Commission on dual-use 
research and capability development.14 
Dual-use initiatives can reduce costs, 
enhance civil–military interoperability and 
improve the competitiveness of Europe’s 
defence industry. They also provide 
opportunities for defence-related projects 
to receive common funding through the 
European Structural and Investment Funds,15 
COSME16 and Horizon 2020.17 Key dual-
use projects include cyber systems, RPAS, 
and situational awareness and satellite 
14 See also M. Drent, L. Landman and D. Zandee, 
The EU as Security Provider, Clingendael Report, 
December 2014, sections 4 and 5.
15 For a short guide to structural funds for dual use, 
see the EDA brochure available at: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/
brochures/esf-brochure. 
16 COSME: the EU programme for the 
Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs).
17 Horizon 2020: the EU’s major research and 
innovation funding programme.
systems. For example, the various maritime 
surveillance capabilities of the EU member 
states and EU agencies that are now grouped 
under CISE could be augmented with a 
‘military layer’ through the MARSUR network 
developed by the EDA. The European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) data service 
Marsurv-1 in support of operation Atalanta 
has set a precedent for such civilian–
military information exchange. However, 
legal barriers need to be addressed to allow 
for systematic civilian–military information 
exchange.18
The principles of dual-use can also be 
applied to the pooling and sharing of 
capabilities. For example, maritime patrol 
aircraft, RPAS and helicopters can be used 
for both civilian tasks (such as border 
security, law enforcement, and search 
and rescue) and military tasks and can be 
placed in a common pool, which can be 
drawn from when necessary. This reduces 
redundancies, enhances cost effectiveness 
and makes capabilities available to member 
states that would have a hard time acquiring 
or sustaining them on their own. Sharing 
capabilities and costs with other actors also 
relieves defence budgets from some of the 
pressures of austerity. Such pooling and 
sharing initiatives should not only be among 
civilian and military authorities of EU member 




Maritime security efforts stimulate 
cooperation and coordination among 
European and non-European defence actors, 
as shown by EU counter-piracy efforts 
around the Horn of Africa since 2008. The 
experiences from the Horn are reflected 
in the Maritime Security Strategy, and the 
strategy in turn provides opportunities for 
18 For more information on such civilian–military 
cooperation, see ‘Case Study on Maritime Security’, 
in M. Drent, C. Homan and D. Zandee, Civil–Military 
Capacities for European Security, Clingendael 
Report, December 2013.
19 FRONTEX is the agency for the management of 
operational cooperation at the external borders of 
the EU member states, and was established in 2004.
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solidifying some of the ad-hoc arrangements 
that emerged from the counter-piracy efforts. 
For example, in the context of EU operation 
Atalanta, flexible arrangements were made 
for information-sharing between the EU 
and NATO (a long-time hurdle in EU–NATO 
cooperation), which can now be expanded. 
Information-sharing and coordination 
efforts by the EU also include the merchant 
shipping sector and national operations 
with Chinese, Indian, Iranian and other non-
European navies. In this context, lessons 
have been learned about maritime situational 
awareness, information-sharing, coordination 
among various stakeholders by a variety of 
entities, and friendly exchanges with foreign 
navies.20 Facilitating (informal) international 
cooperative frameworks and exchanging 
with major players are a boon to the EU’s 
credibility as an international security actor.
Comprehensive Approach
Counter-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa 
region provided a test case for the EU’s 
comprehensive approach. A sustainable 
solution to piracy required comprehensive 
action on land as well as on sea. The EU 
launched the Training Mission Somalia to 
train Somali security forces, and EUCAP 
Nestor, which focuses on regional maritime 
capacity-building. Atalanta’s mandate 
has been expanded to allow for military 
action on shore. The Strategic Framework 
for the Horn of Africa21 brought together 
Commission and CSDP actors who need to 
work together in an operational setting. In 
addition, the Operations Centre within the EU 
Military Staff was activated for the first time, 
although on an ad-hoc basis, to coordinate 
and find synergies for CSDP efforts in the 
region. The EU Maritime Security Strategy 
incorporates the lessons from the Horn and 
provides an opportunity to address some 
of the coordination issues between actors22 
20 ‘EU Naval Force Commander Visits Chinese Navy 
Frigate CNS Linyi in the Gulf of Aden’, EUNAVFOR 
press release, 2 February 2015.
21 Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 
A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 
16858/11, 14 November 2011.
22 EEAS, Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report, March 
2014, p. 12.
and policies23 that have been reported in 
this context.
Enhancing the EU’s Role as a Global 
Actor
The EUMSS calls for enhancing the EU’s 
role as a global actor and security provider, 
in particular through its efforts in the 
so-called European Neighbourhood. In the 
Neighbourhood and adjacent regions, the 
link between comprehensive security at sea 
and on land that is made in the EUMSS is 
particularly relevant. Large, and growing, 
populations are concentrated in coastal 
regions of West Africa and around the Indian 
Ocean. With many people depending on 
fishing, trading and other economic activities 
at sea for their livelihoods, disruptions 
in the maritime domain, such as illegal 
fishing, trafficking and dumping waste 
have negative consequences for stability 
on land, particularly because many of these 
states have limited means for governing and 
policing their territorial waters and Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ). Civilian and military 
capacity-building encourages stabilization 
of coastal states and makes these regions 
less likely to produce piracy and serve as 
sources or routes for immigration or arms-, 
drugs-, and human-trafficking to Europe. 
Capacity-building can include the training of 
coastguards, building on experiences with 
the EU capacity-building mission EUCAP 
Nestor, and enhancing local and regional 
maritime awareness by furthering activities 
such as the Piracy, Maritime Awareness 
and Risks (PMAR) system of the Joint 
Research Centre and Enhancing Maritime 
Security and Safety through Information-
sharing and Capacity-building (MARSIC) 
of the Commission’s Critical Maritime 
Routes Programme (CMR). Engaging 
with Commission programmes not only 
makes sense from an effectiveness and 
comprehensive approach perspective, but 
can also make common funds available for 
CSDP activities.
23 B. van Ginkel, ‘EU Governance of the Threat of 
Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia’, in Inge Govaere 
and Sara Poli (eds), EU Management of Global 
Emergencies: Legal Frameworks for Combating 
Threats and Crises, 2014, pp. 330–350.
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Increased EU involvement in the Indian 
Ocean region is also relevant for geopolitical 
reasons.24 A significant portion of the 
transport of energy and goods from and to 
Europe moves through the Indian Ocean, 
while competing regional power and rising 
major powers such as Iran, Pakistan, China 
and India operate in the region. The EU 
has direct interest in the governance of 
maritime security and defence issues in the 
Indian Ocean in order to prevent a negative 
security spiral and to reduce the likelihood of 
(accidental) hostilities. Information exchange 
and de-confliction of counter-piracy activities 
around the Horn of Africa have proven 
successful in bringing navies together and 
enhancing trust. The EU should consider 
expanding such activities to the entire Indian 
Ocean (taking on board existing efforts such 
as the CMR programme) and promoting new 
confidence-building measures, drawing on 
lessons from the South China Sea.25 This 
could start with proposing a conduct for 
unplanned encounters at sea, which would 
provide non-binding rules of the road to 
prevent escalation of tensions between 
militaries at sea.26 In this regard, EU naval 
forces could play an exemplary role.
In the context of an integrated approach 
to security and diplomacy, the EU could 
consider the use of naval assets in support 
of diplomatic and trade relations with 
regional coastal states or global maritime 
‘swing states’.27 Such activities have been 
24 See Frans-Paul van der Putten, Thorsten Wetzling 
and Susanne Kamerling, Geopolitics and Maritime 
Security in the Indian Ocean: What Role for the 
European Union?, Joint Policy Brief by Clingendael 
and The Hague Centre for Global Justice, 
August 2014.
25 See Maritime Confidence-Building Measures in the 
South China Sea Conference, ASPI Special Report, 
September 2013.
26 Such a code was agreed for the Western Pacific 
in April 2014 by 21 nations, including the United 
States, China and Japan, at the 14th Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium in Qingdao, China.
27 States such as India, Brazil and Indonesia, which 
have regional influence over oceans’ governance 
and a mixed record of promoting a stable and 
liberal order at sea. See J. Kraska, Global Swing 
States and the Maritime Order, German Marshall 
Fund and Center for a New American Security, 
November 2012.
undertaken by EU member state vessels 
underway or returning from operations.28 
Future calls of port could therefore be made 
in the context of EU policies supported by 
the EEAS and the Commission and financially 
supported with common funds, such as 
the Instrument contributing to Stability and 
Peace (IcSP), in order to bolster the visibility 
of the EU as a global security provider.
Although the EUMSS provides no specifics 
about regional priorities, in global terms 
the focus of EU maritime involvement is 
unlikely to be on the Asia–Pacific theatre. 
This resonates with the geographic division 
of labour between the United States 
and Europe that has emerged within the 
transatlantic relationship. This has arguably 
been the result of a lack of European 
attention and capacity to act towards 
security in this region, instead of a conscious 
strategic choice. Although the Asia–Pacific 
region will be vital to global maritime security 
in the coming decade, the EU is not well 
positioned to play a major role. On occasion, 
EU participation in regional multilateral 
forums is blocked by China. Over time, the 
EU may secure a seat at the relevant regional 
tables based on its political and economic 
clout, but without significant naval presence 
in the region, it is unlikely to be a serious 
partner in maritime security dialogues. 
Yet an EU strategic ‘pivot’ towards the 
Asia–Pacific – particularly one that includes 
defence assets – is unlikely for two reasons. 
First, the challenges within the direct EU 
Neighbourhood – tension with Russia, 
conflict in the Middle East, and instability in 
North Africa and the Sahel – make it difficult 
to devote resources and attention to such 
a ‘far away’ region, particularly because 
US assets in the EU’s Neighbourhood are 
being redeployed to Asia, and European 
assets will need to fill their place. Second, 
the necessary support from EU member 
states for such a shift is lacking. Some, 
such as Germany, are worried about the 
EU potentially getting caught in a military 
confrontation between China and the United 
28 For example, the Dutch Navy supported a national 
diplomatic trade mission to India and the training of 
local coastguards off the coast of West Africa in the 
context of the African Partnership.
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States. Others, such as the United Kingdom, 
feel that their naval involvement in the region 
is better served by a bilateral approach 
rather than a common EU one. If the EU is 
serious about playing a major role in shaping 
Asian security architecture, it would need 
to step up its efforts. Given the current level 
of involvement, the best course available to 
the EU is to support cooperative security and 
capacity-building in the region from the ‘side 
line’ through its bilateral relations – ‘enabling 
others to act’.29
Absorbing European Defence?
At the European border, the main security 
challenges are illegal immigration, 
trafficking, organized crime and terrorism. 
Activities in this regard not only include 
security management at the EU borders, 
but also stabilization of the so-called 
‘pre-frontier’ where the root causes of 
these security issues lie. The response 
to these issues involves both the CSDP 
and the communitarian Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) – including its 
external dimension. Integration of these 
policies should lead to better coherence and 
synergies among involved actors, policies 
and capabilities. However, it also raises 
the question of whether defence is being 
absorbed by the civilian domain and whether 
this is detracting from military tasks and the 
intergovernmental nature.
Border Management
The recent increase of immigration into 
Europe from North Africa across the 
Mediterranean Sea has put the issue of 
maritime border management high on 
the agenda. In 2014 about 160,000 illegal 
crossings were registered, straining the 
Italian maritime border operation Mare 
Nostrum to its limits.30 The EU border 
management agency FRONTEX, which is 
tasked with monitoring and controlling the 
external borders, subsequently launched 
29 Yeo Lay Hwee, ‘The EU’s Role in Shaping Asia’s 
Security’, europesworld.org, 7 January 2014.
30 Figures from FRONTEX operational data, 
January–October 2014, 
http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes.
operation Triton.31 FRONTEX provides 
surveillance and coordinates (military) 
capabilities, which need to be supplied 
by member states. Member states can 
be compensated for their operating costs 
through the Internal Security Fund, which 
was established to promote implementation 
of the internal security strategy and the 
management of external borders.32
The EUMSS furthers the notion of incor-
porating navies into the border security 
paradigm. In particular in the case of illegal 
immigration, naval assets should be used 
with caution, as they can become a pull 
factor because of search and rescue (SAR) 
responsibilities under international law. 
Others also warn that the emerging border 
security approach is circumventing EU 
rule of law frameworks such as mandates, 
competences, legislative procedures, and 
rules determining ‘who’ can do ‘what’ and 
‘where’.33
Pre-frontier and Crisis Management
Illegal immigration, as well as trafficking, 
terrorism and cross-border crime policies 
are part of the AFSJ. However, because 
many of these issues originate abroad, the 
AFSJ has acquired an external dimension 
– dealing with border management, rule 
of law and security sector reform in third 
countries. The AFSJ’s policies hereby overlap 
with those of the CSDP. While the linkage 
between the internal and external security 
dimensions has been acknowledged in 
many strategic documents, gaps exist in 
the cooperation between the two policies. 
For example, cooperation needs to be 
strengthened between the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) and the Standing 
31 European Commission, ‘Frontex Joint Operation 
“Triton”: Concerted Efforts to Manage Migration 
in the Central Mediterranean’, MEMO/14/566, 
7 October 2014.
32 Regulation (EU) No. 515/2014 of 16 April 2014 
establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, 
the instrument for financial support for external 
borders and visas.
33 S. Carrera and L. den Hertog, Whose Mare? 
Rule of Law Challenges in the Field of European 
Border Surveillance in the Mediterranean, CEPS, 
January 2015.
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Committee on Operational Cooperation 
on Internal Security (COSI). The roadmap 
“Strengthening Ties between CSDP and 
FSJ” thus needs to be further implemented.34  
This roadmap identifies areas of practical 
cooperation between the AFSJ and CSDP 
and covers, for example, intelligence-sharing 
between FRONTEX and the EU Intelligence 
Centre (IntCen) at the EEAS as part of 
Eurosur’s Common Pre-Frontier Intelligence 
Picture. CSDP (military) support for 
integrated border management is already an 
established feature, and FRONTEX has been 
intensively involved in the planning of CSDP 
missions through its liaison office in Brussels. 
Coordination and cooperation between the 
European Commission and the EEAS during 
all crisis-management phases are critical – 
for example, ensuring that short-term CSDP 
actions connect well to the Commission’s 
long-term structural approaches, notably 
those for development cooperation and 
Neighbourhood Policy. Alternatively, tensions 
can also emerge because of ‘contradictory 
value assumptions and intended policy 
outcomes’ between CSDP goals for 
‘state-building’ that are aimed, ideally, at 
addressing the root causes of instability 
and FRONTEX’s focus on ‘gate keeping’, 
which centres on managing the effects 
of such instability.35 The coordination of 
civilian and military elements in crisis 
management is located primarily with EEAS 
crisis-management structures. However, 
crisis-management coordination between the 
Commission and EEAS suffers from overlap 
and unclear divisions of labour.36
34 “Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ”, 
doc. 18173/11, December 2011. 
35 E. Gross, D.4.4. Policy Recommendations: Report 
on Managing the Changing Relationship between 
CFSP/CSDP and the Jurisdiction and Activities of 
FRONTEX, November 2010, p. 5.
36 See M. Drent, L. Landman and D. Zandee, The EU 
as Security Provider, Clingendael Report, December 
2014, section 3.
Pooling and Sharing
While there are benefits to linking the AFSJ 
and CSDP, there is also the risk of military 
capacities being absorbed in civilian-led 
maritime security activities, making them 
unavailable to national, CSDP or NATO 
tasks. Armed forces are already stretched 
thin because of defence cutbacks. Liberally 
committing military capabilities to fighting 
organized crime and illegal immigration 
can make it more difficult to attend to 
core defence tasks. While it is tempting for 
armed forces to prove their added value by 
contributing to alternative tasks, structurally 
diverting ‘idle’ capabilities can lead to 
decreased availability and readiness for 
national as well as EU and NATO defence 
tasks. NATO experienced this with its 
standing naval forces, which were used 
for Operation Ocean Shield, instead of 
forces supplied by members through the 
normal force generation process.37 Maritime 
support for internal security policies should 
therefore aim to use civilian assets foremost, 
and to call on military assets only when 
these provide an explicit added value over 
civilian assets. Available naval assets could 
be earmarked and pooled for such tasks, 
although this should not lead to ‘standing’ 
EU naval forces. A schedule system of ‘on 
call’ naval assets for CSDP tasks that are 
comparable to EU Battlegroups would be 
better suited.38 Furthermore, availability 
rosters should be created to ensure 
compatibility with CSDP, NATO and bilateral 
obligations.
37 At the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014, 
the Alliance pledged to change this, stating: 
‘We will reinvigorate NATO’s Standing Naval Forces 
by making their composition and the duration 
of national contributions more flexible and, in 
principle, no longer using them for protracted 
operations or for operations with low-end tasks’.
38 A roster system for FRONTEX already exists.
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The Defence Industry and 
Capability Development
The EU Maritime Security Strategy and 
Action Plan reinforce the Commission’s 
increasing involvement in the defence 
sector. The European Commission is involved 
through its funding programmes (ESF, 
COSME and Horizon 2020, as described 
earlier), regulation of the internal market 
where it clamps down on the use of Article 
346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)39 and the practice 
of ‘offsets’40 in defence procurement, 
and through its involvement in setting 
standards, certification and requirements 
that also apply to dual-use or defence-
related systems, for example RPAS or cyber 
systems. The Commission hereby directly 
and indirectly affects the interoperability 
and types of capabilities that are available 
to the European armed forces. This is not 
necessarily negative, since input from the 
civilian side is essential for good dual-
use projects, and the strategy’s networked 
multi-level governance approach can 
produce results, whereas strict inter-
governmentalism would become bogged 
down. However, this does require the active 
involvement of defence actors in order to 
ensure that defence concerns are uploaded 
into the process. Defence ministries should 
divert more of their scarce resources to 
such efforts.
39 Article 346 TFEU allows EU member states 
to exempt defence and security procurement 
contracts from internal market regulation on the 
basis of national security.
40 Offsets involve a country receiving compensation 
in job creation, product orders or payments from 
another country in return for buying their defence 
goods.
External Action
While the EEAS and EU member states are 
the primary actors in external action in the 
maritime security domain, the European 
Commission is involved through several 
programmes. Cooperation among these 
actors and their policies needs improvement, 
as the experience from the Horn of Africa 
showed. In this regard, the Commission’s 
Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) programme 
raises questions about the coherence 
between Commission and EEAS activities. 
Led by the Directorate-General for 
Development Cooperation (DEVCO), the 
CMR programme has employed various 
activities for improving security along 
strategic maritime points from West Africa to 
the Malacca Straits. For example, GRIMCO 
was launched to address piracy in the Gulf 
of Guinea. It focuses on local civilian and 
military maritime capacity-building and 
assisting regional states in coordinating their 
maritime patrols and surveillance activities. 
However, the EEAS and CSDP instruments 
seem to be only marginally involved and 
do not benefit from a ‘train and equip’ 
approach or leveraging naval exercises with 
local partners for capacity-building and 
strengthening diplomatic ties. This is also of 





The EU Maritime Security Strategy is a 
test case for marrying internal–external, 
civilian–military, private–public and 
intergovernmental–supranational elements 
into a comprehensive multilevel governance 
approach to security. This results in a 
process characterized by some as a 
networked informal ‘Facebook’ approach, 
or ‘experimentalist governance’.41 It provides 
much flexibility for establishing cooperation 
where it can work. It also means that the 
EUMSS and Action Plan are more à la carte, 
and some issues may be left unattended. 
The approach also means that efforts are 
shaped by informal advocacy and active 
involvement by the implementing networks. 
The Commission is inherently strong in this 
regard. Those who do not participate, for 
example because of lack of resources, may 
not see their concerns reflected. From a 
defence perspective, this means that defence 
ministries should consider putting more 
resources towards being actively involved 
in the implementation of the EUMSS, 
shaping dual-use capability development 
and creating projects that are eligible for EU 
common funding programmes.
41 Carrera and den Hertog, Whose Mare?, p. 24.
As with so many policies and strategies, 
what finally becomes of the EUMSS is 
dependent on its implementation. Defence 
actors have to play their part to ensure 
that European defence cooperation and 
the CSDP are bolstered through the Action 
Plan. The groundwork for fruitful integrated 
cooperation is there, and the EUMSS 
provides many avenues for promoting 
defence cooperation. Examples include 
advancing the defence industry and dual-
use research agenda of the Council and 
Commission, the development or pooling 
and sharing of dual-use capabilities such 
as RPAS, and enhancing the EU’s role as a 
security provider through international naval 
coordination, confidence-building measures 
and information exchange, in particular in 
the Indian Ocean. Frictions between internal 
and external policies and actors still exist 
and need to be addressed, for example at 
the pre-frontier where the CSDP and AFSJ 
overlap. The risk of defence cooperation 
being absorbed into internal communitarian 
policies does exist to some extent in the 
context of curbing illegal immigration using 
naval assets, and making them unavailable 
for NATO, CSDP or national defence 
responsibilities. The principle of ‘civilian 
assets first, military assets when necessary’ 
and availability rosters should therefore 
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